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Abstract
In this paper we introduce a novel gossiping primitive
to support privacy preserving data analytics (PPDA). In
contrast to existing computational PPDA primitives such
as secure multiparty computation and data randomization
based approaches, the proposed primitive “anonymous gos-
siping” is a communication primitive for privacy preserving
personalized information aggregation complementing such
traditional computational analytics. We realize this novel
primitive by composing existing gossiping mechanisms for
peer sampling & information aggregation and onion rout-
ing technique for establishing anonymous communication.
This is more an ‘ideas’ paper, rather than providing con-
crete and quantified results.
Keywords: privacy, anonymity, aggregation, gossip algo-
rithms
“It is perfectly monstrous the way people go about nowadays saying
things against one, behind one’s back, that are absolutely and entirely
true.” — Oscar Wilde
1 Introduction
Information aggregation and mining is often used to
obtain collective intelligence and generate a panoramic
(macroscopic) view of a system or to device useful rec-
ommendation mechanisms. An interesting niche which has
been studied for the last decade is that of privacy preserving
data mining (PPDM). The essential idea, to quote the sem-
inal paper on PPDM [1], is “Since the primary task in data
mining is the development of models about aggregated data,
can we develop accurate models without access to precise
information in individual data records?”. The early works
on PPDM were based on random perturbation of informa-
tion. Since then, a new class of PPDM based on secure
multiparty computation [14] has also evolved. The trade-
offs between the two approaches are mainly on accuracy
and computational complexity & scalability. Research on
both these individual families of privacy preserving data an-
alytics (PPDA) as well as hybridized solutions continue in
full steam. Privacy preserving data mining in P2P environ-
ments [4] has also gained considerable attention in recent
years.
In this paper we address an orthogonal question. Can we
facilitate collaborative data analytics among users without
disclosing the identity of who are participating and con-
tributing the data? Computational PPDAs do not provide
anonymity. Such privacy is important, say, when the ana-
lytics is carried out for a specific subset of users with some
shared characteristics, such that besides the privacy of the
individual records, the users may be interested to even pre-
serve privacy in terms of them having those characteristics.
We propose a communication primitive (anonymous
gossiping1) which facilitates such privacy. Specifically, we
adapt a well studied point-to-point anonymized communi-
cation technique, onion routing [10, 8] to achieve it. Note
that the actual data analytics itself however may be addi-
tionally with or without preserving privacy of the individ-
ual records. For example, for an anonymized paper sub-
mission, it is ok that the reviewers can read the content of
the paper, as long as they do not know who wrote the pa-
per. It is in this sense that our mechanism compliments
the existing computational primitives. Anonymous gossip-
ing finds ready usage in emerging P2P applications such as
user affinity based personalized decentralized search [13, 3]
& personalized recommendation in decentralized online so-
cial networks [5].
While anonymous communication in p2p systems is an
old and well studied problem, e.g., Freenet [7], the novelties
of this paper are (i) defining a novel communication prim-
itive for PPDA, and (ii) proposing a concrete way to do so
by composing well studied existing building blocks.
In this short paper, we limit ourselves to defining this
new problem and sketching a first solution for the same.
A more rigorous analysis and evaluation of the proposed
mechanism’s security, performance, overheads and subse-
quent necessary optimization or exploration of alternatives
are all issues for future study.
In Section 2 we provide a more succinct description of
the problem along with a sketch of the solution. We elabo-
1Epidemic information dissemination leveraging anonymous interac-
tions in mobile ad hoc network has been studied in the past, and uses the
same name [6], but what we do is completely unrelated.
rate in detail our assumptions and notations in Section 3 be-
fore providing the anonymous gossiping protocol in Section
4. We wrap up in Section 5 with concluding remarks high-
lighting several interesting extensions and research prob-
lems that present themselves from the current work.
2 Problem statement & solution sketch
We want to facilitate the following:
1. Allow user specific information (lets call it user pro-
file) to be used to carry out any kind of personalized
aggregation/clustering, etc. Such mechanisms can then
be used for various personalized services such as rec-
ommendation or query expansion [3, 13].
2. Ensure that an user can not be associated with her2 pro-
file by others, even while individual users benefit from
personalization facilitated by analysis of information
aggregated from other similar users.
The basic outline of a potential solution to achieve the
above mentioned objectives comprise of the following steps
and building blocks:
1. Aggregation task delegation: Each user delegates the
task of personalized aggregation to a proxy peer.
2. Proxy peers interact among each other to carry out the
aggregation task on behalf of the users.
3. Ensure that the proxy peer is oblivious of the identity
of the user(s) on whose behalf it carries out aggrega-
tion task. This in turn will ensure users’ privacy. This
necessitates a mechanism for users to assign the task to
a proxy without being identified, and also a mechanism
for the proxy to still be able to deliver back the aggre-
gated information to the original user without knowing
who it is.
Here we describe a mechanism (anonymous gossiping)
to achieve the last point. How the aggregation task itself is
carried out among the proxies is an orthogonal issue. This
includes the issues of both how proxies interact among each
other, and how they carry out the data analytics. Anony-
mous gossiping is generic in that it can be applied to pro-
vide user privacy while using arbitrary gossiping algorithms
for information aggregation.
Whether any peer is adequate to act as a proxy, or
whether some other considerations such as trustworthiness,
or betweenness in social graph (facilitating quicker aggre-
gation) etc. need to be taken into account while delegating
the task is ignored in the current work.
2For simplicity, we choose to use the feminine form to address the
users, instead of using his/her/its on every occasion.
3 Assumptions and notations
Our solution relies on the following assumptions and ex-
isting primitives.
1. Users form and participate in an overlay. This overlay
may be a classical unstructured network or a semantic
or social overlay.
2. Users use public key as their logical identifier in the
system. However, there is no need for a public key
infrastructure (PKI) since we are not trying to establish
if a specific public key belongs to a specific user or not.
Public key is used so that anything signed with it can
be decrypted by only its corresponding private key.
3. A random set of peers (public keys and corresponding
contact information such as IP address/port number)
can be obtained without an adversary knowing who
obtained a specific information. This assumption is
important, otherwise, if one can determine who all ob-
tained a specific peer ID from the sampling service,
then it reduces the degree of anonymity.
A random set of peers can readily be obtained using
gossip based peer sampling [12]. We argue that peers
who participate in the process of peer sampling for a
relatively long time would encounter sufficiently large
number of other peers to mitigate any set intersection
analysis by an adversary.
4. Proxies delegated by users of similar profiles can dis-
cover each other and carry out the aggregation task.
Note that this last assumption is needed for the aggre-
gation task, and is orthogonal to the anonymity issues.
Gossip based mechanism like T-man [11] or variants
[16] can be applied for this. Note also that the gossip-
ing overheads for the various tasks like peer sampling
and information aggregation can be amortized.
We use the following notations while detailing the
anonymous gossiping mechanism.
αi Public key and ID of peer i.
Ei(.) Encryption of message with public key of peer αi, so that
only she can decrypt it.
Φi Random set of peers that peer αi has obtained somehow.
κi A symmetric en/de-cryption key created by peer αi.
κi(.) Message encrypted with the key κi.
pii Profile of peer αi. The records of the profile may/not need
themselves to be perturbed or obfuscated for privacy preserv-
ing data analytics [1]. That is however an orthogonal issue.
pi′i Aggregated/personalized clustered information corresponding
to profile pii.
4 Anonymous gossiping
There are three logical phases for anonymous gossiping:
(phase I) aggregation task delegation to a proxy in an anony-
mous manner, (phase II) the proxies carrying out the dele-
gated aggregation tasks, and finally (phase III) obtaining the
results back from the delegate in an anonymous manner.
The aggregation task (phase II) is an interesting problem
on its own right. Either existing solutions [9, 2, 13] or new
ones may be applied for it. We consider it as a black-box
and focus on the other two phases as described next.
In the description below we consider a scenario where
Alice is using anonymous gossiping to carry out privacy
preserved personalized aggregation.
4.1 Delegation of aggregation task
Aggregation task is delegated to a proxy as follows:
• Obtain ΦAlice, a moderately large and random subset
of peers in the system, e.g., using peer-sampling [12].
• Determine the candidate αµ for task delegation where
αµ ∈ ΦAlice.
Alice needs to send the message msg =
(piAlice, κAlice) containing her profile and a sym-
metric key to this delegate anonymously.
Note that the message contains the profile, but not
Alice’s identity. However, if the profile itself con-
tains identity revealing details (such as search terms
from ‘ego search’) then our approach can not provide
anonymity. Generally speaking, possible obfuscation
of the records using traditional PPDM techniques [1]
may additionally be necessary.
• Choose k other peersαi ∈ ΦAlice, where k is a random
integer chosen uniformly from some predefined range,
say [5, . . . , 20]. These peers will be used to form an
onion route [8, 10] between Alice and the delegate αµ.
• Send to peer αρ1 an onion encoded message
Eρ1(Eρ2(...(Eρk−1(Eρk(Eµ(msg), µ), αµ), αρk ), ...), αρ2)
When a peer αρj receives an onion encoded message
from αρj−1 , she can only decrypt the outermost layer
with her own private key. Upon decryption, it ob-
tains another encrypted message along with the iden-
tity/address of the next node to which it should pass
the same. Thus, intermediate nodes do not know how
many nodes or who have already routed the message,
nor the nodes who will subsequently do so. Each node
only knows its immediate up & down-stream peers for
an onion route. Given that the nodes were chosen at
random by the source further reduces chances of col-
lusion. The random choice of the length k of the onion
route provides a further level of obfuscation and plau-
sible deniability for Alice. It also provides robust-
ness against small scale opportunistic collusion among
some of the intermediate nodes to unravel the route re-
quester’s identity. Onion routing is robust against traf-
fic snooping provided a minimal amount of ambient
traffic is present in the system [15].
Once the designated delegate αµ obtains the msg =
(piAlice, κAlice), it can carry out the Phase-II task of aggre-
gation and analytics using piAlice to compile pi′Alice.
4.2 Collecting aggregated information
One option to collect the aggregated information is for
Alice to probe the delegate, and pull the response along a
(new) onion route. Note that Alice should not reveal her
identity to the delegate, so the delegate can not know which
node to send the response to. The response κAlice(pi′Alice)
encrypted with the symmetric key originally sent by Alice,
and digitally signed by the delegate αµ may be sent up-
stream along the onion route (since each node knows the
immediate up & down-stream neighbors of a route without
the delegate having to know specifically the destination.
There are however some potential drawbacks with such
a pull based approach. Firstly, since Alice does not know
if and when the delegate has completed computation of
pi′Alice, she may have to initiate pull on multiple occasions.
Secondly, and more fundamentally, a passive attacker can
monitor the network traffic (sniffing for κAlice(pi′Alice)) and
detect the terminal point. This can be alleviated if the mes-
sage is encrypted by the intermediate nodes at every hop
using the public key of the immediate node upstream.
An alternative to pull is a blind gossip based push mech-
anism. Whenever proxy αµ needs to send the aggregated
information pi′Alice back to Alice, she can just flood the
network with corresponding pi′Alice, αµ, κAlice(piAlice) dig-
itally signed with its private key. On receiving any such
flooded message originating from αµ, Alice can still deter-
mine whether the message is indeed meant for her or not us-
ing κAlice(piAlice) even if αµ is also proxy for other peers.
Alice should continue forwarding the message in all cases,
so that no one monitoring the network can identify her as
the intended destination for the information. A possible op-
timization during flooding is that each peer propagates the
message to only peers it has obtained onion routed messages
within a past time window. That will ensure, in absence of
churn, that the source (Alice) gets the aggregated informa-
tion, while avoiding a larger scale flooding.
5 Concluding remarks
We have defined a new communication primitive,
namely anonymous gossiping, which can support privacy
preserving data aggregation and analytics complementing
traditional computational primitives for PPDA based on
randomization or secure multi-party computation. We have
provided a rough but concrete sketch of one way to real-
ize anonymous gossiping by composing existing techniques
like peer sampling and onion routing. Use of such mature
techniques is expected to facilitate a quick implementation
of anonymous gossiping.
Additionally, this paper opens interesting avenues span-
ning algorithms, implementation as well as analysis which
forms our ongoing work. Exploration of new, more effi-
cient, robust and churn resilient algorithms for anonymous
gossiping is one direction. Clever implementation, partic-
ularly amortizing the various gossiping overheads (needed
during peer-sampling and aggregation) provide nice sys-
tems design opportunities. Threat analysis including quan-
tifying the trade-offs between the degree of anonymity and
the time and messaging overheads in the peer-sampling pro-
cess is a third frontier.
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